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Abstract
Background
An outbreak of Marburg hemorrhagic fever was first observed in a gold-mining village 
in northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in October 1998.
Methods
We investigated the outbreak of Marburg hemorrhagic fever most intensively in May 
and October 1999. Sporadic cases and short chains of human-to-human transmis-
sion continued to occur until September 2000. Suspected cases were identified on 
the basis of a case definition; cases were confirmed by the detection of virus antigen 
and nucleic acid in blood, cell culture, antibody responses, and immunohistochem-
ical analysis.
Results
A total of 154 cases (48 laboratory-confirmed and 106 suspected) were identified 
(case fatality rate, 83 percent); 52 percent of cases were in young male miners. Only 
27 percent of these men reported having had contact with other affected persons, 
whereas 67 percent of patients who were not miners reported such contact (P<0.001). 
Most of the affected miners (94 percent) worked in an underground mine. Cessa-
tion of the outbreak coincided with flooding of the mine. Epidemiologic evidence 
of multiple introductions of infection into the population was substantiated by the 
detection of at least nine genetically distinct lineages of virus in circulation during 
the outbreak.
Conclusions
Marburg hemorrhagic fever can have a very high case fatality rate. Since multiple 
genetic variants of virus were identified, ongoing introduction of virus into the 
population helped perpetuate this outbreak. The findings imply that reservoir hosts 
of Marburg virus inhabit caves, mines, or similar habitats.
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T
he filoviruses marburg and ebola 
cause severe hemorrhagic fevers with high 
case fatality rates. Marburg virus (Lake Vic-
toria subtype) of the family Filoviridae was first 
isolated and Marburg hemorrhagic fever first de-
scribed in 1967 during outbreaks in Germany and 
Yugoslavia. These outbreaks were linked to infect-
ed monkeys imported from Uganda.1-4 Three mi-
nor outbreaks involving one to three cases were 
subsequently reported in Africa between 1975 and 
1987.5-9 Transmission of the virus between humans 
is poorly understood, and the natural reservoir re-
mains unknown.
In October 1998, the chief medical officer for 
Watsa Zone in northeastern Democratic Republic 
of the Congo reported the occurrence of a fatal 
hemorrhagic syndrome in young men working in 
gold mines in the village of Durba. Owing to con-
tinued military activity of the civil war of 1997, it 
was only after the doctor himself died of the dis-
ease on April 23, 1999, that an investigative team 
was able to enter the area. On May 6, a diagnosis of 
Marburg hemorrhagic fever was confirmed from 
samples sent to the National Institute for Commu-
nicable Diseases (NICD) in Johannesburg, South 
Africa.10,11
At the request of Congo’s Ministry of Health, 
an international team of experts, coordinated by 
the World Health Organization, arrived in Durba 
on May 8, 1999, to assist local officials in the in-
vestigation and control efforts.12,13 The team found 
that the outbreak had subsided, and they depart-
ed after three weeks. However, continued reports 
of sporadic cases prompted a follow-up mission in 
October 1999. This report describes the laboratory 
diagnosis, virus phylogeny, epidemiology, and clin-
ical presentation of Marburg hemorrhagic fever 
revealed by the two investigations, as well as by 
sustained surveillance by local officials with in-
termittent outside assistance.
Methods
Outbreak Area 
The outbreak of Marburg hemorrhagic fever cen-
tered on the mining village of Durba, which has 
an estimated population of 25,000, and the near-
by district capital Watsa (population, 60,000), ap-
proximately 150 km from the borders of Uganda 
and Sudan. At the time of the outbreak, the area 
was held by Ugandan soldiers and Congolese reb-
els in opposition to the government of Congo. Gold 
mining is the major economic activity in the re-
gion, supplemented by subsistence farming and 
hunting. Organized commercial mining ceased 
when the civil war reached Durba in 1997 and was 
replaced by illegal, albeit open, mining involving 
mainly young, untrained men.
The government-sponsored Reference Health 
Center in Durba was a rudimentary facility staffed 
by a few nurses, and most seriously ill people 
sought care 15 km away at the two hospitals in 
Watsa: Watsa General Reference Hospital, a 56-bed 
government regional reference center, and a 70-bed 
private hospital affiliated with the mining com-
pany, the Offices de Mines d’Or de Kilo Moto 
(OKIMO). There were 16 additional small health 
centers in the area of Durba and Watsa, but medi-
cal supplies were severely limited at all facilities. 
Toward the end of the outbreak, the Reference 
Health Center in Durba was refurbished and used 
as the main treatment center for Marburg hemor-
rhagic fever.
Case and Contact Definitions
A confirmed diagnosis of the disease required 
the following: acute illness for up to three weeks 
in the absence of associated trauma, another fo-
cal disease process, or a response to antibiotics or 
antimalarial agents; at least three of the follow-
ing signs and symptoms: fever, generalized body 
pains, nausea and vomiting, headache, anorexia, 
malaise, abdominal pain, diarrhea, dyspnea, dys-
phagia, hiccups, conjunctivitis, rash or petechiae, 
and abnormal bleeding from the nose, mouth, 
gastrointestinal tract, or genitourinary tract; and 
a positive laboratory test for Marburg virus infec-
tion. Patients were suspected of having the dis-
ease if they had the characteristic clinical syn-
drome, even if they had no specimens available for 
laboratory confirmation. A contact was defined 
as someone who had had physical contact with a 
patient with confirmed or suspected Marburg vi-
rus infection during acute illness or after death, 
or with fomites.
Figure 1 (facing page). Cases of Marburg Hemorrhagic 
Fever in the Area of Durba and Watsa, Democratic Re-
public of the Congo, October 1998 to October 2000, 
According to Whether the Case Was Suspected or Con-
firmed (Panel A) and the Patients’ Occupations (Panel B).
The date of onset was not precisely known for 27 pa-
tients and was assumed to be seven days before either 
death or hospitalization. In Panel B, patients listed as 
family or community members included 31 house-
wives, 15 children, 6 traders, 5 farmers, and 6 persons 
in other assorted professions.
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Surveillance and Care of Patients
We searched for patients by reviewing available rec-
ords of patients and death registers at all health 
facilities and pharmacies in the area of Durba and 
Watsa dating back to October 1998. If clinical data 
suggested a diagnosis of viral hemorrhagic fever, 
the patient was seen and the hospital chart re-
trieved, if possible. Investigators also attempted to 
interview patients with suspected cases and sur-
vivors or their family members and followed up 
on rumors. Contacts of patients with confirmed 
or suspected disease were followed daily for signs 
of illness for the maximum incubation period (21 
days) and placed in an isolation ward if they be-
came ill.14 To gain insight into possible previous 
transmission of Marburg virus in the area, we re-
viewed hospital records as far back as possible and 
conducted interviews with local medical person-
nel, community leaders, and survivors of possible 
previous outbreaks.
Laboratory Analysis 
Whole-blood samples drawn from patients with 
suspected cases were shipped on dry ice to the 
NICD or, on occasion, to the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), where they were 
tested by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay 
(ELISA) for Marburg virus antigen and Marburg 
virus–specific IgM and IgG antibodies and by re-
verse-transcriptase–polymerase-chain-reaction 
(RT-PCR) assay for Marburg virus nucleic acid and 
were cultured in Vero 76 or Vero E6 cells in an ef-
fort to isolate the virus, with the use of modifica-
tions of techniques previously published for Ebo-
la hemorrhagic fever.15-17 Punch-biopsy specimens 
of skin were obtained from deceased persons, fixed 
in 10 percent formalin, and sent to the CDC for im-
munohistochemical analysis, as described previ-
ously.18 Primers used in RT-PCR assays included 
published sequences targeting a filovirus-specific 
segment of the polymerase (L) gene17 and nested 
primers targeting the Marburg virus VP35 gene, 
designed at the CDC. (The RT-PCR analysis, nucle-
otide sequencing of amplicons, and sequence data 
analysis are described in the Supplementary Ap-
pendix, available with the full text of this article 
at www.nejm.org.)
A patient was considered to have Marburg hem-
orrhagic fever if any of the following laboratory 
tests was positive: ELISA antigen detection, RT-PCR 
assay, virus culture, ELISA IgM antibody, ELISA 
IgG antibody in a patient with a clinical or epide-
miologic history compatible with Marburg hem-
orrhagic fever, or immunohistochemical analysis.
Environmental Assessment
Investigators visited all mining sites in Durba with 
members of the mining company. During the vis-
it, they recorded the geographic location, the type 
of mining (surface or underground), the working 
conditions at the mine, and the number of work-
ers at each site.
Statistical Analysis
Data that were collected in the field were record-
ed on case-report and contact-tracing forms, en-
tered into an Epi Info 6.0 database (CDC), and im-
ported into SPSS version 10.0 (SPSS) for further 
analysis, with use of the chi-square test, Fisher’s 
exact test, and Student’s t-test, as appropriate. Two-
sided P values were calculated with a P value of less 
than 0.05 used to indicate statistical significance.
Results
Timeline and Demographic characteristics 
of Patients
From October 1998, when the first case was iden-
tified, through September 2000, when the last case 
was identified, there were 154 cases (48 confirmed 
Table 1. Laboratory Confirmation of Marburg Hemorrhagic Fever in 48 Patients 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1999–2000.
Test Positive Results 
no./total no. (%)
Performed 1–15 days after onset
Antigen-detection ELISA 25/34 (74)
L gene RT-PCR 31/34 (91)
Nested RT-PCR of VP35 33/33 (100)
Virus isolation 31/32 (97)
IgM-antibody ELISA 8/34 (24)
IgG-antibody ELISA 7/34 (21)
Immunohistochemical analysis 7/14 (50)
Performed post mortem 3–8 days after onset
Immunohistochemical analysis 8*
Performed 31–1376 days after onset
IgM-antibody ELISA 1/6 (17)
IgG-antibody ELISA 6†
* The results of immunohistochemical analysis were negative for 26 other pa-
tients suspected of having Marburg hemorrhagic fever for whom data were 
discarded as unconfirmed.
† One patient consented to being tested 1376 days after the onset of illness. 
Data could not be obtained for several other patients.
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and 106 suspected) (Fig. 1A). Of the 48 patients 
with confirmed cases, 34 had positive test results 
for ELISA antigen, RT-PCR, or virus isolation; 
6 who were tested late in the course of the disease 
were antibody-positive only; and 8 received a diag-
nosis on the basis of positive results on immuno-
histochemical analysis of postmortem skin sam-
ples (Table 1).
The RT-PCR assay was positive for the L gene in 
blood samples from 31 of 34 patients with viro-
logically confirmed cases (but positive on all cell-
culture isolates), whereas the nested PCR assay for 
Marburg virus protein 35 (VP35) protein was posi-
tive in samples from all 33 patients tested. (One 
sample had insufficient material to be tested for 
VP35 protein.) Three blood samples that were 
positive on PCR had no virus isolated in culture, 
but one had been heat-inactivated before culture 
and another had heavy bacterial contamination.
Because of the initial delay in gaining access 
to the area of Durba and Watsa, 52 percent of the 
cases occurred before the arrival of the first in-
ternational team and were identified retrospec-
tively. Most cases were in young adult male min-
ers residing in Durba, followed by housewives and 
infants (Table 2). Of the 145 patients for whom 
demographic data were available, 18 (12 percent) 
were under the age of 15 years. Marburg hemor-
rhagic fever was noted in members of at least eight 
ethnic or linguistic groups. Although cases were 
reported from Watsa and various surrounding vil-
lages, further investigation invariably revealed a 
link to Durba. Many patients who listed a place 
of residence other than Durba were found to have 
been living and working in Durba at the time of 
their illness.
Source of Primary Infection 
and Transmission
A seasonal pattern was noted during the two years 
of observation, with transmission typically begin-
ning in October or November and peaking in Janu-
ary or February (Fig. 1A). On each occasion, the 
upsurge in cases was primarily among miners and 
was followed by spread to their families and oth-
er members of the community and punctuated by 
occasional nosocomial infections (Fig. 1B).
Multiple short, apparently independent chains 
of transmission were noted, with seven being the 
largest number of cases noted in any single chain. 
Incidences of secondary spread from at least 20 
patients, tertiary spread from at least 3 patients, 
and quaternary spread from at least 2 patients 
were documented, most often related to the expo-
sure of family members caring for a sick miner. 
The conclusion that independent chains of infec-
tion began in miners is supported by the finding 
that only 20 of 75 miners (27 percent) reported 
having had previous contact with someone with 
Marburg hemorrhagic fever. This number contrasts 
with 20 of 31 housewives (65 percent), 11 of 15 
infants (73 percent), 6 of 7 health care workers (86 
percent), and 10 of 17 members of other profes-
sions (59 percent) for whom such contact was re-
ported (P<0.001 for the comparison between min-
ers and all other groups collectively). Furthermore, 
33 of 49 female patients (67 percent), of whom 29 
were housewives, reported having had previous 
contact with someone with Marburg hemorrhagic 
fever, as compared with 33 of 104 men (32 percent) 
(P<0.001). This finding suggests that in contrast 
to men, women frequently contracted the virus 
through secondary transmission in their tradi-
Table 2. Demographic Characteristics of Patients 
with Marburg Hemorrhagic Fever in Durba, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, 1998–2000.*
Characteristic Patients
Male sex — no./total no. (%) 104/153 (68)
Age
Mean — yr 28
Range 7 days to 72 yr
Occupation — no./total no. (%)
Miner 75/145 (52)
Housewife 31/145 (21)
Infant 15/145 (10)
Health care worker 7/145 (5)
Trader 6/145 (4)
Farmer 5/145 (3)
Other† 6/145 (4)
Village of residence — no./total no. (%)
Durba 121/151 (80)
Watsa 24/151 (16)
Other 6/151 (4)
* Data were not available for all patients in each category.
† Patients in this category included two teachers, two stu-
dents, an electrician in the Goroumbwa mine workshop, 
and a retired nurse who had been out of the profession 
for a long time. No occupation was recorded for nine 
  patients, but eight of the nine were young men, mostly 
from Durba, who were probably miners.
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tional roles as caretakers for sick persons in the 
home. The association between mining and appar-
ent primary infection remained significant after 
controlling for the stage of the epidemic, the vil-
lage of residence, and type of case (confirmed vs. 
suspected).
Unlike most filovirus outbreaks, nosocomial 
infection did not play an important role in virus 
transmission in the area of Durba and Watsa. Five 
separate incidents at two health centers resulted 
in six infections among health care workers (three 
nurses, one doctor, one midwife, and one nurse–
midwife).19 A case of the disease was also noted 
in a traditional healer, but the circumstances of 
infection were not available.
The nucleotide sequences were determined 
for amplified gene fragments of Marburg virus 
(GenBank accession numbers DQ466108 through 
DQ466195 and DQ447652). Maximum likelihood 
analysis of sequence differences detected among 
Marburg virus VP35 gene fragments from various 
cases revealed that at least nine genetic lineages 
of Marburg virus were in circulation during the 
Durba outbreak. These lineages have been desig-
nated 1 through 9 for convenience, with the num-
bers bearing no taxonomic significance (Fig. 2). 
Phylogenetic analysis of sequence data on L gene 
fragments yielded the same nine lineages (results 
not shown). The genetic stability of the lineages 
and reproducibility of the findings are borne out 
by the facts that identical results were obtained for 
sequential samples from three patients and for 
sequences determined directly from clinical spec-
imens or on cultured virus isolates from all pa-
tients. Moreover, identical results were obtained 
for split samples from four patients that were se-
quenced independently at the two participating 
laboratories (CDC and NICD). Identical sequenc-
es were also found within but not across clusters 
of epidemiologically linked patients (Fig. 2), al-
though there was a tendency for the same lineages 
of virus to reappear at irregular intervals during 
the two-year outbreak.
Clinical Presentation and Case Fatality Rate
Of the 150 patients with Marburg hemorrhagic 
fever for whom information was available, 97 
sought medical care (65 percent), and these patients 
presented for treatment a median of 4.5 days (range, 
0 to 24) after the onset of symptoms. Clinical in-
formation was available for 129 patients: through 
examination or review of medical records for 95 
patients and retrospective interviews with the pa-
tient or relatives for 34 patients (Table 3). At least 
three pregnant women with Marburg hemorrhag-
ic fever were reported, all of whom died; one had 
a miscarriage, and one delivered an infant who died 
seven hours after birth.
The case fatality rate was 83 percent (125 of 150 
patients) and did not vary significantly according 
to age, sex, profession, medical treatment, place of 
medical care (hospital vs. health center), time from 
the onset of symptoms until admission, phase of 
the outbreak, or status as a laboratory-confirmed 
case (vs. a suspected case) or primary transmis-
sion (vs. secondary transmission). Among patients 
who died, the deaths occurred a median of 7.0 days 
(range, 0 to 70) after the onset of symptoms. Mor-
tality was significantly increased in persons with 
conjunctival injection and hiccups and decreased 
in those with chest pain (Table 3). Difficulty in 
breathing and most bleeding signs were more fre-
quent in patients who died than in survivors, al-
though differences were not significant. Many of 
the associations with fatal disease have been pre-
viously noted as indicators of end-stage filovirus 
infection.20
Historical Review
Interviews and reviews of hospital records revealed 
that a disease called “syndrome hémorragique de 
Durba,” which was always associated with mining, 
was common knowledge among villagers and 
health care workers in the area of Durba and Wat-
sa. A doctor at OKIMO reportedly first recognized 
the disease in a male miner in 1987, and it became 
common practice in the 1990s for such patients 
to be admitted to Watsa General Reference Hospi-
tal. Many health care workers recalled past clusters 
of the disease among miners, often with nosoco-
mial transmission, and the disease was usually fa-
tal. Outbreaks involving at least 50 patients in total 
reportedly occurred in 1987, 1990, and 1992. An 
outbreak in 1994 involved an estimated 20 pa-
tients, including 1 doctor and 2 nurses, at least 
8 of whom died. An outbreak in 1996 involved 
two nurses, both of whom died, and an outbreak 
in 1997 involved five patients, including one nurse, 
all of whom died. A former nurse who was found 
to be positive for Marburg IgG antibodies reported 
that he, a doctor, and a fellow nurse had contracted 
illnesses similar to Marburg hemorrhagic fever 
after performing obstetric surgery on a patient 
with probable disease in 1994. The doctor and one 
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nurse died of the disease. Hospital records dating 
back to 1991 (the earliest available) corroborated 
the existence of sporadic cases of the disease, par-
ticularly at Watsa General Reference Hospital, in-
cluding a larger outbreak in 1994 (Fig. 3). After a 
doctor died in 1994, admissions to the hospital 
remained at a low level for more than a year until 
the arrival of his successor, the doctor who died 
while investigating the outbreak reported here 
(Fig. 3). Admissions again declined during the civil 
war of 1997. No specific trends were apparent with 
regard to age or sex, and no further information 
was available on professional or other exposures 
for these historical cases.
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Figure 2. Maximum Likelihood Analysis of Differences in Nucleotide Sequences.
Differences were detected between Marburg virus VP35 gene fragments, amplified by RT-PCR from RNA extracted from clinical speci-
mens or virus isolates from patients in the Durba outbreak (red), and those available for reference isolates (black). Sequence designa-
tions (e.g., 09DRC99may26) consist of a two-digit case code (for the Durba outbreak) or abbreviated name (for reference isolates), fol-
lowed by the country code (Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC], Germany [GER], Kenya [KEN], and Zimbabwe [ZIM]) and the year, 
month, and day of the onset of the illness. Nine genetic lineages of Marburg virus that were detected during the Durba outbreak are la-
beled 1 through 9 on the right-hand margin of the phylogram. Patients are represented by single sequences, but identical results were 
obtained for sequential samples from three patients and for sequences determined directly on clinical specimens or on cultured virus 
isolates. Moreover, identical results were obtained for split samples from four patients that were sequenced independently at the two 
participating laboratories (CDC and NICD). Isolates from patients in Durba that were epidemiologically linked (indicated by brackets) 
also yielded identical sequences: 10DRC99 and 11DRC99 were from a husband and wife, respectively; 06DRC99, 07DRC99, and 
08DRC99 were from a mother, grandmother, and daughter, respectively; 23DRC00 was from the son of a patient with suspected disease 
who putatively also transmitted fatal infection to four other people, including a nurse who was the uncle of the patient with isolate 
24DRC00; 31DRC00 and 33DRC00 were from a husband and wife, respectively; and 27DRC00 and 29DRC00 were from brothers. Boot-
strap values (obtained from an analysis of 500 pseudoreplicates of the data set) are indicated at each branch point in which values ex-
ceed 50 percent.
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Environmental Assessment
Mining was conducted at seven sites in Durba dur-
ing the outbreak, and in addition, alluvial gold was 
recovered by divers at a few sites along the Kibali 
River. Five of the mining sites consisted of surface 
diggings or small pits, and these were essentially 
devoid of vertebrate fauna. A sixth site, the Durba 
mine, consisted of short tunnels into a hillside 
where the ore appeared to be depleted, and dig-
ging occurred mainly on the hillside above the tun-
nels. Most mining took place at the seventh site, the 
Goroumbwa mine, where there was a large quarry 
that had been exploited historically, plus two ver-
tical shafts from which horizontal tunnels extend-
ed at various levels to the ore body, at a maximum 
depth of approximately 400 m. Miners gained un-
authorized access to the underground workings 
through an opening at the base of the quarry and 
reportedly remained underground for up to a week 
at a time. Owing to problems with drainage pumps, 
flooding began in 1995, and the Goroumbwa mine 
was completely inundated by September 2000. The 
illegal and spontaneous nature of the mining ac-
tivities precluded accurate estimates of the num-
ber of miners who worked at each site.
Of the 53 miners with Marburg hemorrhagic 
fever for whom information was obtained, 50 (94 
percent) worked in Goroumbwa, which suggested 
that exposure to the fauna or flora of the mine was 
a risk factor. Animals found in the Goroumbwa 
mine included bats, rodents, shrews, frogs, snakes, 
cockroaches, crickets, spiders, wasps, and moth 
flies, although there was no history of direct expo-
sure to animals or insect bites in any patient with 
Marburg hemorrhagic fever. However, the envi-
ronment was heavily soiled with human and bat 
excrement, and the miners typically worked with 
rudimentary hand tools and without protective 
gear. The only other vertebrates that were detected 
were small populations of bats in the short tunnels 
of the Durba mine, where two patients with the 
disease were known to have worked. However, the 
implication that the Goroumbwa mine was the 
principal site of infection is supported by the lack 
of detection of a single case of the disease among 
104 patients from the area of Durba and Watsa 
who were suspected of having the disease and were 
tested in continued surveillance from the time that 
the mine closed in September 2000 through De-
cember 2005.
Discussion
Despite the fact that Marburg virus is thought to 
be maintained in nature exclusively in Africa, the 
1998–2000 epidemic of Marburg hemorrhagic fe-
ver in the area of Durba and Watsa was the first 
outbreak recorded in a community setting in which 
the presumed primary cases occurred in indige-
nous Africans.1-7 Although the lack of infrastruc-
ture in this remote, impoverished, and war-torn 
Table 3. Recorded Signs and Symptoms for 129 Patients with Marburg 
Hemorrhagic Fever in the Area of Durba and Watsa, Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, 1998–2000.*
Sign or Symptom
All Patients 
(N = 129)
Survivors 
(N = 22)
Patients Who
Died (N = 107)
number (percent)
Non-hemorrhagic 
Fever 120 (93) 22 (100) 98 (92)
Malaise or fatigue 108 (84) 19 (86) 89 (83)
Headache 101 (78) 16 (73) 85 (79)
Nausea or vomiting 98 (76) 17 (77) 81 (76)
Anorexia 94 (73) 17 (77) 77 (72)
Abdominal pain 74 (57) 13 (59) 61 (57)
Diarrhea 73 (57) 13 (59) 60 (56)
Myalgia or arthralgia 71 (55) 12 (55) 59 (55)
Difficulty breathing 70 (54) 8 (36) 62 (58)
Difficulty swallowing or sore throat 53 (41) 7 (32) 46 (43)
Hiccups 51 (40) 4 (18)   47 (44)†
Conjunctival injection or red eyes 48 (37) 3 (14)   45 (42)‡
Lumbar pain 10 (8) 1 (5) 9 (8)
Chest pain 8 (6) 4 (18)   4 (4)†
Cough 7 (5) 2 (9) 5 (5)
Agitation 2 (2) 0  2 (2)
Hemorrhagic
Hematemesis 96 (74) 15 (68) 81 (76)
Melena 71 (55) 9 (41) 62 (58)
Gingival bleeding 44 (34) 5 (23) 39 (36)
Epistaxis 40 (31) 4 (18) 36 (34)
Petechiae 9 (7) 2 (9) 7 (7)
Bleeding from injection sites 8 (6) 0  8 (7)
Hemoptysis 6 (5) 2 (9) 4 (4)
Hematoma 3 (2) 0  3 (3)
Bleeding from any site 89 (69) 13 (59) 76 (71)
* Of the 129 patients, 40 had laboratory-confirmed disease and 89 had suspect-
ed disease. 
† P = 0.03 for the comparison between survivors and those who died.
‡ P = 0.01 for the comparison between survivors and those who died.
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location hampered the collection of data, several 
new features of the disease were revealed by the 
investigation.
Bleeding was more frequent and rash much less 
common in the area of Durba and Watsa than in 
previous outbreaks of the disease.2,3,5-8,21,22 Al-
though mild nonhemorrhagic cases have been de-
scribed that might escape detection, data regard-
ing seroprevalence do not support the occurrence 
of frequent subclinical infections in the area of 
Durba and Watsa or elsewhere.23-25 Bleeding ap-
pears to be more common in Marburg hemor-
rhagic fever than in Ebola hemorrhagic fever, in 
which it was noted in a minority of cases in some 
outbreaks.26,27 Rash may have simply been more 
difficult to detect in darker-skinned Africans in 
the area of Durba and Watsa than in white patients 
who were involved in past outbreaks of Marburg 
hemorrhagic fever. Similar racial disparities have 
been noted between expatriate missionaries and 
Africans with Ebola hemorrhagic fever.20,28,29 Al-
ternatively, true differences with respect to race or 
geography may exist, perhaps related to genetic or 
acquired differences in immune response.
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Figure 3. Total Number of Admissions and Febrile Hemorrhagic Illnesses in the Watsa General Reference Hospital, January 1991 
to September 1999.
Diagnoses that were considered to be febrile hemorrhagic illnesses were “hemorrhagic fever,” “syndrome hémorragique de Durba” 
(Durba hemorrhagic syndrome), and “hemorrhagic gastritis or gastroenteritis” if the symptoms included fever. Hospital admissions 
declined after the only available local doctor and a nurse died with syndromes compatible with Marburg hemorrhagic fever in 1994 
and again with the onset of the civil war in 1997.
The New England Journal of Medicine 
Downloaded from nejm.org at LONDON SCH HYGIENE & TROPICAL MED on February 14, 2014. For personal use only. No other uses without permission. 
 Copyright © 2006 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved. The new england journal of medicine
n engl j med 355;9 www.nejm.org august  31, 2006 918
The case fatality rate of Marburg hemorrhagic 
fever was far greater in the area of Durba and 
Watsa than in European outbreaks in 1967, in 
which 7 of 32 patients died (22 percent), or cu-
mulatively in the minor outbreaks in eastern and 
southern Africa, in which 3 of 6 people died (50 
percent), but was similar to rates reported for a 
recent outbreak of Marburg hemorrhagic fever in 
Angola and for outbreaks of the Zaire subtype of 
Ebola virus infection.1-3,6,9,26,30 Possible explana-
tions for the high case fatality rate in the area of 
Durba and Watsa are limited access to sophisti-
cated health care and the fact that many patients 
had to be conveyed over 15 km of rough road from 
Durba to a hospital in Watsa without motorized 
transport. Other possible factors included a high 
prevalence of underlying malnutrition, coinfections 
(with malaria and human immunodeficiency vi-
rus), and potential differences in infectious dose 
or route of inoculation. (Most infections in Europe 
were associated with contact with infected mon-
keys.) Since infection with individual genetic lin-
eages of virus could be confirmed in only a small 
number of patients, a comparison of the virulence 
of various strains cannot be made, but the high 
overall death rate implies that the lineages were 
uniformly lethal under the circumstances of the 
outbreak.
With the exception of recent outbreaks of Ebo-
la hemorrhagic fever in Gabon and Congo, in 
which multiple independent chains of transmis-
sion resulted from contact with infected nonhu-
man primates, molecular and epidemiologic data 
from most filovirus outbreaks suggest the occur-
rence of a single primary introduction or relatively 
few primary introductions of infection into hu-
mans, followed by propagation through human-
to-human contact.31-37 In contrast, the evidence 
from the area of Durba and Watsa suggests that 
multiple, short, independent chains of human-
to-human transmission occurred. This hypothe-
sis is supported by evidence that at least nine 
genetic lineages of virus circulated during the 
outbreak, as well as the occurrence of identical 
lineages within but not across clusters of epide-
miologically linked cases (Fig. 2). Since labora-
tory tests were applied to a minority of cases, 
there could have been additional, undiscovered 
lineages of virus.
It is possible that mining was a confounding 
variable for some other common exposure to in-
fection. However, no other obvious commonality 
between miners with Marburg hemorrhagic fever 
could be elicited, and the association between 
Marburg hemorrhagic fever and the Durba vil-
lage, which extended over many years, ceased 
abruptly with the closure of the Goroumbwa mine. 
The perpetuation of multiple lineages of virus 
over many years in a fixed location would require 
a suitably large reservoir of a host population, 
with constant recruitment of susceptible animals 
through reproduction or migration. Generally, 
only small vertebrate or invertebrate populations 
fulfill these criteria. There were no large, wild 
vertebrate populations in the vicinity of Durba, 
and existing evidence suggests that large mam-
mals are more likely to be dead-end hosts (or, 
at most, intermediate hosts) for the filovirus-
es.31,38-40 Primary infection with Marburg virus 
was putatively linked to entry into the Kitum cave 
on the slopes of Mt. Elgon in Kenya in two of the 
four previously recorded outbreaks of Marburg 
hemorrhagic fever.6,7 As in the Durba outbreak, 
isolates in the 1980 and 1987 outbreaks in Kenya 
span the known genetic diversity of Marburg vi-
rus (Fig. 2), implying the existence of a long as-
sociation of the virus with a reservoir host popu-
lation in the cave. Thus, the cumulative evidence 
suggests that the reservoir of Marburg virus in-
habits or frequents caves and mines or similar 
habitats.
Supported by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance of the 
U.S. Agency for International Development and the Department 
of Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response, World 
Health Organization, Geneva.
No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was 
reported.
This article is dedicated to Dr. Innocent Katenga Bonzali and 
his family. Dr Bonzali died of Marburg hemorrhagic fever while 
investigating the outbreak described here.
We are indebted to the inhabitants, patients, families, health 
care workers, leaders, and authorities of Durba–Watsa for their 
invaluable contribution to the investigation and control of Mar-
burg hemorrhagic fever in the area; to the administration of the 
OKIMO mining company in Durba for their assistance during 
the outbreak and subsequent investigations; and to Laura Mor-
gan and Kent Wagoner for technical assistance in the prepara-
tion of the manuscript. 
appendix
The following members of the International Scientific and Technical Committee for Marburg Hemorrhagic Fever Control in the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo participated in the study: World Health Organization, Geneva — R. Arthur, A. Belli, G. Rodier; Institut de Méde-
cine Tropicale du Service de Santé des Armées, Marseille, France — E. Bertherat; CDC, Atlanta — R. Downing, C.J. Peters, W.-J. Shieh; Barrick-OKIMO 
Mining, Durba, Democratic Republic of the Congo — F. Chimbalanga, G. Kiza, C. Nakwa, P. Nbuluyo; World Health Organization, Kampala, 
The New England Journal of Medicine 
Downloaded from nejm.org at LONDON SCH HYGIENE & TROPICAL MED on February 14, 2014. For personal use only. No other uses without permission. 
 Copyright © 2006 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved. marburg hemorrhagic fever with multiple genetic lineages
n engl j med 355;9 www.nejm.org august  31, 2006 919
References
Siegert R, Shu HL, Slenczka HL, Pe-
ters D, Muller G. The aetiology of an un-
known human infection transmitted by 
monkeys (preliminary communication). 
Ger Med Mon 1968;13:1-2.
Martini GA, Knauff HG, Schmidt HA, 
Mayer G, Baltzer G. A hitherto unknown 
infectious disease contracted from mon-
keys: “Marburg-virus” disease. Ger Med 
Mon 1968;13:457-70.
Todorovitch K, Mocitch M, Klasnja R. 
Clinical picture of two patients infected 
by the Marburg vervet virus. In: Martini 
GA, Siegert R, eds. Marburg virus disease. 
Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1971:19-23.
Feldmann H, Slenczka W, Klenk HD. 
Emerging and reemerging of filoviruses. 
Arch Virol Suppl 1996;11:77-100.
Gear JS, Cassel GA, Gear AJ, et al. 
Outbreak of Marburg virus disease in Jo-
hannesburg. Br Med J 1975;4:489-93.
Smith DH, Johnson BK, Isaacson M, 
et al. Marburg-virus disease in Kenya. Lan-
cet 1982;1:816-20.
Johnson ED, Johnson BK, Silverstein D, 
et al. Characterization of a new Marburg 
virus isolated from a 1987 fatal case in 
Kenya. Arch Virol Suppl 1996;11:101-14.
Nikiforov VV, Turovskii Iu I, Kalinin 
PP, et al. A case of a laboratory infection 
with Marburg fever. Zh Mikrobiol Epide-
miol Immunobiol 1994;3:104-6. (In Rus-
sian.)
Outbreak of Marburg virus hemor-
rhagic fever — Angola, October 1, 2004–
March 29, 2005. MMWR Morb Mortal 
Wkly Rep 2005;54:308-9.
B e r t h e r a t  E ,  T a l a r m i n  A ,  Z e l l e r  H .  
Democratic Republic of the Congo: be-
tween civil war and the Marburg virus. Med 
Trop (Mars) 1999;59:201-4. (In French.)
Biot M. Tribute to Dr. Katenga Bon-
zali. Trop Med Int Health 2000;5:384.
Marburg fever, Democratic Republic 
of the Congo. Wkly Epidemiol Rec 1999;
74:145.
Viral haemorrhagic fever/Marburg, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Wkly 
Epidemiol Rec 1999;74:157-8.
Colebunders R, Sleurs H, Pirard P, et 
al. Organisation of health care during an 
outbreak of Marburg haemorrhagic fever 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
1999. J Infect 2004;48:347-53.
Ksiazek TG, West CP, Rollin PE, Jahr-
ling PB, Peters CJ. ELISA for the detection 
of antibodies to Ebola viruses. J Infect Dis 
1999;179:Suppl 1:S192-S198.
Ksiazek TG, Rollin PE, Williams AJ, et 
al. Clinical virology of Ebola hemorrhagic 
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
fever (EHF): virus, virus antigen, and IgG 
and IgM antibody findings among EHF 
patients in Kikwit, Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, 1995. J Infect Dis 1999;179:
Suppl 1:S177-S187.
Sanchez A, Ksiazek TG, Rollin PE, et 
al. Detection and molecular characteriza-
tion of Ebola viruses causing disease in 
human and nonhuman primates. J Infect 
Dis 1999;179:Suppl 1:S164-S169.
Geisbert TW, Jaax NK. Marburg hem-
orrhagic fever: report of a case studied by 
immunohistochemistry and electron mi-
croscopy. Ultrastruct Pathol 1998;22:3-17.
Borchert M, Muyembe-Tamfum JJ, Cole-
bunders R, Libande M, Sabue M, Van Der 
Stuyft P. Short communication: a cluster 
of Marburg virus disease involving an in-
fant. Trop Med Int Health 2002;7:902-6.
Bwaka MA, Bonnet MJ, Calain P, et al. 
Ebola hemorrhagic fever in Kikwit, Dem-
ocratic Republic of the Congo: clinical 
observations in 103 patients. J Infect Dis 
1999;179:Suppl 1:S1-S7.
Stille W, Bohle E. Clinical course and 
prognosis of Marburg virus (“green mon-
key”) disease. In: Martini GA, Siegert R, 
eds. Marburg virus disease. Berlin: Spring-
er-Verlag, 1971:10-8.
Egbring R, Slenczka W, Baltzer G. 
Clinical manifestations and mechanism 
of the haemorrhagic diathesis in Marburg 
virus disease. In: Martini GA, Siegert R, 
eds. Marburg virus disease. Berlin: Spring-
er-Verlag, 1971:42-9.
Bausch DG, Borchert M, Grein T, et al. 
Risk factors for Marburg hemorrhagic fe-
ver, Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
Emerg Infect Dis 2003;9:1531-7.
Monath TP. Ecology of Marburg and 
Ebola viruses: speculations and directions 
for future research. J Infect Dis 1999;179:
Suppl 1:S127-S138.
Borchert M, Mulangu S, Swanepoel R, 
et al. Serosurvey on household contacts of 
Marburg patients. Emerg Infect Dis 2006;
12:433-9.
Khan AS, Tshioko FK, Heymann DL, 
et al. The reemergence of Ebola hemor-
rhagic fever, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, 1995. J Infect Dis 1999;179:Suppl 
1:S76-S86.
Outbreak of Ebola hemorrhagic fe-
ver, Uganda, August 2000–January 2001. 
MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2001;50:73-
7.
Ebola haemorrhagic fever in Sudan, 
1976: report of a WHO/International Study 
Team. Bull World Health Organ 1978;56:
247-70.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
Pattyn S, van der Groen G, Courteille 
G, Jacob W, Piot P. Isolation of Marburg-
like virus from a case of haemorrhagic 
fever in Zaire. Lancet 1977;1:573-4.
Ebola haemorrhagic fever in Zaire, 
1976. Bull World Health Organ 1978;56:
271-93.
Leroy EM, Rouquet P, Formenty P, et al. 
Multiple Ebola virus transmission events 
and rapid decline of central African wild-
life. Science 2004;303:387-90. [Erratum, 
Science 2004;303:628.]
Bausch DG, Rollin PE. Responding to 
epidemics of Ebola hemorrhagic fever: 
progress and lessons learned from recent 
outbreaks in Uganda, Gabon, and Congo. 
In: Scheld WM, Murray BE, Hughes JM, 
eds. Emerging infections 6. Washington, 
D.C.: ASM Press, 2004:35-57.
Rodriguez LL, De Roo A, Guimard Y, 
et al. Persistence and genetic stability of 
Ebola virus during the outbreak in Kikwit, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1995. 
J Infect Dis 1999;179:Suppl 1:S170-S176.
Georges AJ, Leroy EM, Renaut AA, et 
al. Ebola hemorrhagic fever outbreaks in 
Gabon, 1994-1997: epidemiologic and 
health control issues. J Infect Dis 1999;
179:Suppl 1:S65-S75.
Leroy EM, Baize S, Mavoungou E, Ape-
trei C. Sequence analysis of the GP , NP , 
VP40 and VP24 genes of Ebola virus iso-
lated from deceased, surviving and asymp-
tomatically infected individuals during the 
1996 outbreak in Gabon: comparative stud-
ies and phylogenetic character  ization. J Gen 
Virol 2002;83:67-73.
Leroy EM, Souquiere S, Rouquet P, 
Drevet D. Re-emergence of Ebola haemor-
rhagic fever in Gabon. Lancet 2002;359:
712.
Towner JS, Rollin PE, Bausch DG, et 
al. Rapid diagnosis of Ebola hemorrhagic 
fever by reverse transcription-PCR in an 
outbreak setting and assessment of pa-
tient viral load as a predictor of outcome. 
J Virol 2004;78:4330-41.
Formenty P, Boesch C, Wyers M, et al. 
Ebola virus outbreak among wild chim-
panzees living in a rain forest of Cote 
d’Ivoire. J Infect Dis 1999;179:Suppl 1:
S120-S126.
Walsh PD, Abernethy KA, Bermejo M, 
et al. Catastrophic ape decline in western 
equatorial Africa. Nature 2003;422:611-4.
Peterson AT, Bauer JT, Mills JN. Eco-
logic and geographic distribution of filo-
virus disease. Emerg Infect Dis 2004;10:
40-7.
Copyright © 2006 Massachusetts Medical Society.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
Uganda — M. Grabowsky, K. Khantaway; Ministry of Health, Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo — M.N. Kassa; World Health Organiza-
tion, Kinshasa/Kisangani, Democratic Republic of the Congo — L. Kinuani; World Health Organization, Harare, Zimbabwe — K.M. Kondé, O. To-
mori; Médecins sans Frontières, Belgium — J.-P. Mustin; Institut Pasteur, Cayenne, French Guiana — A. Talarmin; and Uganda Virus Research Institute, 
Entebbe, Uganda — B. Tugume.
The New England Journal of Medicine 
Downloaded from nejm.org at LONDON SCH HYGIENE & TROPICAL MED on February 14, 2014. For personal use only. No other uses without permission. 
 Copyright © 2006 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved. 